



When Pinocchio's nose does not grow: belief regarding lie-detectability modulates production of deception

Kamila E. Sip^{1,2,3*}, David Carmel⁴, Jennifer L. Marchant^{5,6}, Jian Li⁷, Predrag Petrovic⁸, Andreas Roepstorff^{1,2}, William B. McGregor² and Christopher D. Frith^{1,6}

¹ Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, Aarhus, Denmark

² Department of Aesthetics and Communication - Linguistics, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

³ Department of Psychology, Rutgers University - Newark, NJ, USA

⁴ Department of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK

⁵ Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, UK

⁶ Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, London, UK

⁷ Department of Psychology, IDG/McGovern Institute for Brain Research Peking University, Beijing, China

⁸ Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Karolinska Institutet Stockholm, A Medical University, Stockholm, Sweden

Edited by:

Matthias Gamer, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Germany

Reviewed by:

Thomas Baumgartner, University of Basel, Switzerland

Nobuhito Abe, Kyoto University, Japan

*Correspondence:

Kamila E. Sip, Social and Affective Neuroscience Lab, Department of Psychology, Rutgers University - Newark, Smith Hall, Room 301, 101 Warren Street, Newark, NJ 07102, USA.
e-mail: ksip@psychology.rutgers.edu

Does the brain activity underlying the production of deception differ depending on whether or not one believes their deception can be detected? To address this question, we had participants commit a mock theft in a laboratory setting, and then interrogated them while they underwent functional MRI (fMRI) scanning. Crucially, during some parts of the interrogation participants believed a lie-detector was activated, whereas in other parts they were told it was switched-off. We were thus able to examine the neural activity associated with the contrast between producing true vs. false claims, as well as the independent contrast between believing that deception could and could not be detected. We found increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), during the production of false (compared to true) claims. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections.

Keywords: mock-crime, deception, beliefs, lie-detection, fMRI

INTRODUCTION

Deception is a complex social behavior that involves the production of false claims. The ability to detect deception is a crucial skill for navigating social interactions. The brain activity underlying the production of deception has been studied using functional MRI (fMRI). The results of these studies have shown that the production of false claims is associated with increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections.


Belief regarding lie-detectability modulates production of deception. The ability to detect deception is a crucial skill for navigating social interactions. The brain activity underlying the production of deception has been studied using functional MRI (fMRI). The results of these studies have shown that the production of false claims is associated with increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections.

(V. J., 1993). F... (V. J., 2004; V. J., 2007; V. J., 2008). T... J... D... F... (..., A..., 2007; B..., 2009). T... (..., A..., 2007; B..., 2009).

(2007); Sip et al. (2008, 2010). S. G. (2004),
 B. (2008); G. (2010, 2012) MRI (2006). I
 (MRI) (K. (2005, 2009; M. (2006)
 T. (2005; G. (2007). I
 S. (2012), IFG
 T. IFG
 P.
 A.
 C.
 I.
 I.
 B.
 P. *believed*?
 S. J. (F.
 F. (2003). S. (P.
 (2004; P. (2005; D. M. (2006; M.
 (2006; S. (2010, 2012). D.
 P.
 (A. (2007; B. (2009)
 (G. (2004, 2006). A. (IFG),
 (ACC, PCC,)
 (S. (2001; G. (2003; L. (2005; N. (2005;
 G. (2007; S. (2012). T. (G.
 (2004, 2006; A. (2007; B. (2009).
 G. (2004, 2006)

T. T. J.
 T. T. J.
 . E J T
 USB. T (. GSR,
) . T
 E (.
 KES) P T
 T
 T N T
 . T USB
 J P
 J . A J
 I
 DC PP,
 B
 T

Figure 1. P.
 H
 T
 P
 I D
 J
 (.) .
 (.) .
 /ə ə /
 /ə ə /



P: ...

P: ... J: ...

T: ... A: 12 ... I: ...

J: ? A: B: ?

... ; ... A:

11 ... *Did you go into the Red-room?*

T: ...

T: ... 35 ...

... J: (1) ...

(14) ... (2) 21 ...

J: ... T: ...

(...), ... F: ... *Did you take earphones from the Red-Room?*

... J: ...

T: ... (...), ...

... T: ...

2 (...) × 2 (...) ... E: ...

... T: ...

A: ... (ASL E-5000) ...

T: ...

I: ... (...) ...

... ; ...

J: ... ; ... (...) ...

..... ;

E 17 S
.....
..... *I didn't steal anything,*
..... (. „ *I would
delay giving a response when asked about the object I didn't steal
to create confusion*).

A
..... (. „
.....),

(G... , 2003; L... , 2005; A... , 2007; B... , 2009; K... , 2009; S... , 2012): IFG, PCC. O

S

Table 1. T

BOLD IFG, PCC (Figure 3). T

I (Figures 4A,B) (Figures 4C,D), (O... , 2007), (G... , 2003; M... , 2006).

E T BOLD

H $t_{(16)} = 5.397, p < 0.001$.

$t_{(16)} = 1.6, p = 0.14$. B

F

($t_{(16)} = 2.54, p < 0.05$. H

$t_{(16)} = 3.643, p < 0.01$.

DISCUSSION

W MRI S O

T

O IFG, PCC R (S... , 2010, 2012), RT

T (. . , K... , 2005; L... , 2005; S... , 2008; S... F... , 2009). T

I T H

H

T

Table 1 | Brain regions showing activation during response production.

Brain region	Hemisphere	x	y	z	t-value	Cluster size
MAIN EFFECT OF RESPONSE (FALSE > TRUE)						
Amygdala	R	30	0	-24	6.98	17
Inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)	R	44	26	10	6.24	25
Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)	L	-2	-12	50	4.83	10
INTERACTION (ON FALSE-TRUE > OFF FALSE-TRUE)						
Hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus	R	36	-18	-18	4.98	26
Temporal pole	L	-44	14	-22	4.89	17

Peak activation coordinates in standard MNI space and their associated t-scores. Regions shown were significantly activated at a threshold of $p < 0.001$ (uncorrected) with a cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels.





FIGURE 3 | The main effect of response (false > true). Panels on the left show the activation cluster and panels on the right show mean parameter estimates in the activation cluster in the right amygdala (A and B), right IFG (C and D), and left PCC (E and F). Deceptive responses in these regions yielded higher BOLD activation than truthful ones, and this difference was not significantly modulated by belief about whether the lie detector was on or off.

... H ... RT ... T ...

O ... (M ... ACC, DLPFC, IFG, ... (... K ... 2005; B ... 2009; G ... P ... 2009; S ... 2010, 2012; G ... 2012) ... T ...



... (2008) .U. ... (DLPFC), ACC, ... T. ... W. ... S. ... (2003). A ...

... and left temporal pole (C and D). In these loci, the difference between the BOLD activation caused by false vs. true responses was abolished (and for the hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, reversed) when participants believed the lie detector was off.

MAIN EFFECTS: DECEPTIVE vs. TRUTHFUL RESPONSES

D ... BOLD ... IFG, PCC. T ... IFG ... (A ..., 2007; B ... 2009; S ..., 2012). H ... D ... (2007); O ... (2007), ... A ... (2007)

... T ... I ... B ... (2009) ... *per se*. ... PCC ... (M ... , 2006). H ... T ... P ... IFG ... (G ... , 2007; S ... , 2012) ... (A ... , 2004) ... (C ... , 2009). I ... IFG ... (S ... , 2012). T ... IFG

INTERACTION OF DECEPTIVE/TRUTHFUL RESPONSE AND BELIEF ABOUT LIE-DETECTABILITY

W ... / ... BOLD ... T ... (C ... , 2003; F ... , 2003; V ... , 2006), ... J ... (M ... , 2002; H ... , 2003), ... (G ... , 2004, 2006). O ... (2007) ... I ... T ... (... ; D ... , 2007; O ... , 2007). T ... T

W ... / ... BOLD ... (...), ... W ... (M ... , 2006), ... (... ; G ... , 2003), ... (2008) . T ... T ... (... , B ... , 2002) ... (2010) . A ... (S ... , 2006). I ... I ... (...) ... (R ... , 2009). A ... H ... ; ... I ... S ... (...) ... T ... T ... (R ... , 2009). E ... (R ... -L ... , 2001). T ... (... , R ... -L ... A ... , 2001; S ... , 2006; W ... S ... , 2012). R ... , W ... (2012)

- A. R., B., S. I., . (2005). T. *Curr. Opin. Neurobiol.* 14, 198–202.
- P., D. A., D., A. B., S., S. M., K., D. J., R., A. H. (2004). C. *J. Appl. Psychol.* 89, 1099–1105.
- R., K. P., S., A., G.-T., M. L., S., M., W., S. M., P., D., (2009). D. *Neuroimage* 47, 2005–2015.
- R., W. R. (1989). A. *Evolution* 6, 223–225.
- R.-L., G., A., I. (2001). A. *Mol. Neurobiol.* 22, 11–20.
- S., T. L., F., B. R. (2009). T. *Appl. Psychophysiol. Biofeedback* 34, 177–187.
- S., K. E., L., M., W., M., M G., W. B., F., C. D., R., A. (2010). T. *Neuropsychologia* 48, 3619–3626.
- S., K. E., R., A., M G., W. B., F., C. D. (2008). D. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* 12, 48–53.
- S., K. E., R., A., M G., W. B., F., C. D. (2008). R. *Trends Cogn. Sci.* 12, 126–127.
- S., K. E., S., J. C., M., J. L., M G., W. B., R., A., F., C. D. (2012). W. I. ? D., , ,
- A. R., B., S. I., . (2005). T. *Front. Neurosci.* 6:58. doi:10.3389/fn.2012.00058
- S., A. P., S., K. E., R., M. D., D., R. J. (2006). T. *Neuron* 49, 631–638.
- S., S. A., F., T. F. D., H., A. E., W., I. D., W., P. W. R. (2001). B. 5432.21.9
- M., D., W., N., L., H. C., E. F., E., D., R. J., F., C. D. (2006). T. *Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci.* 1, 95–106.
- M., F. B., F., S. H., G., N. J., P., S. M., A., H., W., J. M. (2006). B. *MRI. Hum. Brain Mapp.* 26, 262–272.
- M., J., O.-S., R., E., P. J., B., I. E., M., M., J., A., P. A., (2002). T. *J. Neurosci.* 22, 2730–2736.
- N., J. M., C., B. J., E., T., H., T., H., J. (2005). I. *Neuroimage* 25, 267–277.
- O., I. R., P., A., E., (2007). T. *Brain* 130, 1718–1731.
- P., P., D., T., F., P., A., J., C., K., I., M. (2005). P. *Neuron* 46, 957–969.
- P., E. A. (2004). H. *Curr. Opin. Neurobiol.* 14, 198–202.